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Abstract 
The near six decades of Nigeria as an independent nation has been 
fraught with instability arising essentially from attempts at democracy through 
periodic elections. These elections have been largely chacterized by 
hooliganism, ballot-snatching, theft of election materials, kidnapping of 
political opponents, assassination of political rivals, arson, assault and 
physical destruction of election materials and even intimidation and outright 
molestation or killing of election officials. This paper therefore went down the 
memory lane to establish and, using the Marxist theory of state attempt to 
explain, the pattern of elections that have characterized democracy in Nigeria 
and locate the place of citizen observers in Nigerian elections. 
 
Keywords: Election, Democracy, Citizen observation, Opposition, Violence 
 
Introduction 
 Periodic elections have, generally, become a major index for 
measuring democratic compliance and soundness across the globe. According 
to Bratton and Posner (1999:378) elections provide the best criterion for 
orderly leadership succession, entailing popular participation. They ensure 
responsibility and responsiveness on the part of government. According to the 
United Nations (cited in Wanyonyi, 1997: 21), “… the will of the people shall 
be the basis of authority of government. This shall be expressed in periodic 
and genuine elections…”. Not a few argue that sound democratic practice 
depends greatly on respect for civil rights and due process of law. And so 
countries lacking in democratic principles are labelled pariah states. 
            According to Fischer (2002:2) “An electoral process is an alternative 
to violence as it is a means of “which is a product of interaction” (Marco, 
2006:13). Marco said it “is inevitable and therefore must always erupt in any 
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society at various magnitudes...”. Various attempts in Nigeria at democracy 
through elections have only succeeded in providing battle grounds for 
hooliganism, ballot-snatching, theft of election materials, kidnapping of 
political opponents, assassination of political rivals, arson, assault and 
physical destruction of election materials and even intimidation and outright 
molestation or killing of election officials. 
 Nigeria has a long history of electoral violence and makes it a target for closer 
scrutiny or observation (Eleagu, 2016). Even the pre-independence 1959 
federal elections designed by the British to midwife the transition from 
colonial rule to independence was fraught with violence. The antagonistic 
positions assumed by the two major alliances of political groups, i.e., Nigerian 
National Alliances (NNA) and United Progressive Grand Alliance (UPGA) 
meant that no matter which one of the two groups won, the results will be hotly 
contested. (Godowoli 2003:97). As was expected, allegations of manipulation 
of electoral laws and process by the ruling party (NPC) brought about a call 
for boycott of the elections by the opposition. 
          The first post-independence general elections in Nigeria took place in 
December 1964 “and was marred by violence and corruption” 
(Commonwealth Observers Group,2007:5) and did not fare any better in terms 
of electoral violence.  And so the 1964 general elections results were rejected 
by the opposition, especially in the Western region where they resorted to 
violence to contest what they perceived as stealing of their mandate by the 
ruling NPC.  What followed was complete breakdown of law and order or 
operation wetie, earning the region the inglorious reference as the Wild Wild 
West. This afforded the federal government an opportunity to declare a state 
of emergency in the region. The Western regional crisis found strength in the 
“1960/64 census disputes” (Setedu,2005) and along with other factors led to 
the 1966 military coup and the subsequent civil war in 1967 that lasted until 
1970. 
Since independence in 1960 “Nigeria has had a tumultuous political 
history,….experiencing a succession of military coups” (Commonwealth 
Observers Group, 2007:4). Indeed by 1964, less than four years as an 
independent nation, Nigeria had its general elections which “were marked 
with massive rigging; conflict and political violence of high degree, which 
culminated in the military takeover of power in 1966” (Mudasiru, 2005:476).  
 Nigerians again went to the polls in 1979, producing the civilian 
government of Alhaji Shehu Shagari which, as it started its second term in 
1983, was overthrown on December 31, 1983 through a military coup by 
General Muhammadu Buhari.  In August of 1985 the military once again took 
over the political space in Nigeria through a bloodless coup of by General 
Ibrahim Babangida (IBB) which overthrew General Muhammadu Buhari. 
Babangida repealed the decree on press censorship (Commonwealth 




Observers Group:3) and released former President Shehu Shagari and his vice, 
Dr. Alex Ekwueme, from detention. 
 It was, however, criticisms galore between 1985 and 1992 as the 
Ibrahim Babangida regime was accused of countless misdeeds, including 
linking it with the letter bomb that killed Dele Giwa, editor of a critical news 
magazine. Civil society groups rose in defence of democracy. The violence 
that was scarce during the 1993 elections then surfaced around the June 12 
date that Abiola held on to in pursuit of his mandate (Commonwealth 
Observers Group, 2007). 
General Babangida organized Presidential elections for 12 June 1993 
that proved controversial… Provisional results suggested that the 
Yoruba businessman, Chief Moshood Abiola, had a clear lead over his 
rival, Alhaji Bashir Tofa, however, on 23 June 1993 the ruling National 
Defence and Security Council (NDSC), which had replaced the AFRC, 
annulled the elections before the full results could be announced by the 
National Electoral Commission (NEC), which was itself suspended. 
Chief Abiola continued to claim, nevertheless, that he had been duly 
and legitimately elected. Over 100 people were killed in riots 
protesting the decision to annul the election. General Babangida 
announced that there would be a new presidential election on 27 
August, but this was greeted by general disbelief and the Social 
Democratic Party (SDP) announced that it would boycott the election. 
(Commonwealth Observers Group:5) 
 
Following the annulment of the widely perceived free and fair 
elections in 1993 the Group continued noted that protests broke out, including 
strikes. General Babangida “stepped aside” under pressure from various 
quarters,  
handing power on 27 August 1993 to an Interim National Government 
headed by Chief Ernest Shonekan, a non-partisan businessman who 
promised to supervise the organization of fresh elections that were 
scheduled for early 1994. However, on 17 November 1993 Chief 
Shonekan was removed from office and General Sani Abacha, the 
Minister of Defence, took over. The next day General Abacha 
announced the dissolution of all organs of state and bodies established 
under the previous transition programme (p6). 
 
Precisely in June 1994 Chief M.K.O. Abiola was arrested and charged 
with treason for forcefully declaring himself president of Nigeria. Abiola and 
his supporters had gathered at Tafawa Belewa Square in Lagos where he 
declared himself winner of the 1993 presidential election. Many pro-
democracy groups, including National Democratic Coalition (NADECO) 
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chieftains were arrested and jailed for supporting the protests. Some of them 
fled the country. The Commonwealth Group observed further that 
The government took strong action against its other perceived 
opponents. In July 1994 it dissolved the elected executive council of 
the two main petroleum trade unions - the National Union of Petroleum 
and Natural Gas Workers (NUPENG) and the Petroleum and Natural 
Gas Senior Staff Association (PENGASSAN) – replacing them with 
government appointees. The leaders of the two associations were later 
arrested and detained. In March 1995, former Head of state Chief 
Obasanjo and his former deputy, General Shehu Musa Yar’Adua and 
several others, were arrested in connection with an alleged coup plot. 
Chief Obasanjo was subsequently sentenced to life in prison (later 
commuted to 25 years imprisonment) while Yar’Adua and 12 others 
received the death sentence (later commuted to life imprisonment). 
General Yar’Adua later died in custody in suspicious circumstances 
(p6). 
 
 The military Provisional Ruling Council executed Ken Saro-wiwa and 
eight other Ogoni activists on November 10, 1995 after a trial by special 
tribunal on charges of complicity in the murder of four local chiefs. This was 
in spite of many international appeals for clemency and assurances given by 
the Nigerian government to several prominent Commonwealth leaders to the 
effect that it would not proceed with the executions. The executions coincided 
with the Commonwealth Heads of governments meeting in Auckland, New 
Zealand. An immediate consequence of the executions was the suspension of 
Nigeria from the Commonwealth. In a bid to reduce international hostile 
attitude towards his regime General Sani Abacha initiated a transition 
programme. 
Its sole aim was to achieve his own legitimization. Only five political 
parties were approved by his regime, and all five adopted him as their 
presidential candidate for elections that were to be held in October 
1998. However, General Abacha died suddenly on 8 June 1998 and 
was succeeded by General Abubakar, formerly Chief of Defence staff 
(Commonwealth Observers Group,2007:6).  
 
The Commonwealth Observers Group (2007:6) noted that “General 
Abubakar released those accused of involvement in coup attempts (including 
Chief Obasanjo) and repealed many military decrees which had severely 
impinged on human rights. Sadly, Chief Moshood Abiola died on the eve of 
release from detention on 7 July 1998”.  General Abdulsalami Abubakar’s 
regime midwifed the 1999 elections that produced a former military head of 
state, retired General Olusegun Obasanjo of the Peoples Democratic Party 




(PDP), as the winner and new president of Nigeria. While his democratic 
administration lasted Obasanjo declared every May 29 as Democracy Day, a 
holiday in Nigeria to mark the return of democracy in Nigeria. The next 
elections year in Nigeria was 2003 and was special in that it marked the first 
attempt by a democratic regime to conduct elections following the exit of the 
military. 
By 1999 Nigeria recorded a shift from military rule to democratic 
government. And so “By the date of the 2007 state and national elections, the 
country had already recorded success in achieving an unprecedented eight 
years of uninterrupted democratic rule” (Chukwuma,2007:14).Again the 
lesson of the pre-military era seemed lost on the politicians as the Labour 
Electoral Monitoring Team in Nigeria noted that: 
These days many politicians seek power with the aim of promoting 
primitive accumulation. Politics is now seen as a vehicle for making 
quick and easy money. This rents seeking and rent collection mentality 
of politicians can be seen from the desperation of incumbents to hold 
on to power by any means. The counter weight to this is the 
determination and the desperation of the elites outside to get into 
power by any means necessary. To these elites the end result of getting 
control of political power is justified by whatever means is employed. 
This means include violence (LEMT, 2003:89) 
 
Not a few see politics as a means for self service in Nigeria today, 
being the surest, quickest, easiest and most rewarding avenue for escaping the 
growing poverty to which most Nigerians are today condemned. Such survival 
strategy connotes winner takes all syndrome. Political exclusion, therefore, 
accounts for the use of illegitimate means to ensure success at the polls. 
Electoral violence is one of such illegitimate means. Electoral violence, which 
is a consequence of electoral inadequacies, can also be seen as a means of 
perpetrating electoral injustice. A violent electoral environment gives room 
for hijacking of the entire electoral process. Consequently elections become a 
smokescreen or window dressing for stage-managing transitions in Nigeria. 
As TMG coordinator noted “the 2007 elections, unfortunately like most 
electoral contests in Nigeria, assumed the features of warfare rather than open 
and civil competition for political power” (Chukwuma,2007:6,7). 
The propensity of elected officers in Nigeria to tamper with public 
funds with near impunity has made the desire for government or elected 
offices to skyrocket. Even Nigerians in Diaspora who spot the Nigerian 
government officials on shopping sprees overseas are attracted to return and 
contest for even local government chairmanship elections. Of course, they are 
often rigged out even at the party primaries. 
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Institutions abound in Nigeria to ensure free and fair elections. These 
include Independent Electoral Commission (INEC), Department of State 
Security (DSS), Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC), the 
police, army, the electoral tribunals and even election monitors and observers. 
However, concerning the 2007 elections TMG (Chukwuma,2007) also noted 
that “state institutions such as INEC and EFCC saddled with the responsibility 
of conducting free and fair elections and sanitizing the polity, failed woefully 
in their respective tasks.” 
 
Citizen Election Observation in Nigeria 
However, it was not until 1998, with the coming of Transition 
Monitoring Group (TMG) that election observation came into being in 
Nigeria. This was made possible by the identification and application of such 
international and local instruments as the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights of 1948, the African Charter, and the Nigerian Constitution of 1979, 
among others. Some have argued that while observation only entails recording 
of events and deviations therein and making same public or available to the 
institution or election body concerned, monitoring goes further to involve 
authority to correct the observed infractions. Therefore, though the name 
suggests monitoring the TMG was actually involved in election observation, 
as INEC has always insisted that only it (INEC) has the powers to respond to 
any   observed anomaly in an election process, and so all others are mere 
observers. Following in the footsteps of the TMG in other elections are JDPC, 
ACE, FOMWAN, etc. 
 
Justification for Observation 
1. Right to know. This stems from the right to freedom of expression 
which entails right to hold and canvass opinion. 
2. Intra-party squabbles and bickering. This is usually widespread and 
demands scrutiny by independent observers. 
3. Political godfatherism. The political space is fraught with undue 
interference by political god fathers who use their successors as 
puppets and conduits for siphoning public funds. 
4. Political violence. As noted earlier are hardly devoid of violence, 
rancour, acrimony, and bickering. 
5. Election fraud. Several post-election findings suggest fraud as a 
recurring decimal in elections in Nigeria. 
6. Weak institutions. To further compound the matter is the absence of 
strong institutions that can defend democracy in Nigeria. 
7. Public funds. Elections are heavily funded by the state in Nigeria. 
Other sources of funding are the international donor agencies. 
All these call for non-partisan monitoring by local or citizen observers. 




Thus, it is the task of this paper to x-ray, in a historical perspective, 
challenges of citizen elections observation in Nigeria. 
 
Theoretical Framework  
This study adopts the Marxist theory of state as its preferred 
framework for analysis. This school of thought has “three different 
perspectives” (Onuoha: 2003:202). These include the instrumentalists (those 
who see the state as an instrument in the hands of the ruling class) who see the 
state as a mere passive tool in the hands of a powerful ruling class. The 
proponents of this theory consider the state a lifeless entity that has no 
independent will. Marx and Engels argued in the communist manifesto of 
1864 “that the executive is but a committee for managing the common affairs 
of the whole bourgeoisie’’. A second perspective sees in the state a power 
towering above the society and moderating as well as mediating inter- and 
intra-class conflicts while the institutionalists provide the third perspective 
which views the state as a concrete institution or institutional mechanism 
serving the dominant interest, not necessarily the interest of the whole nation. 
The centrality of the state as an instrument of bourgeois oppression and 
exploitation and the unrepentant attempts by politicians to gain and control 
state power thus provides a prism for understanding how elections have served 
democracy in Nigeria. This tallies with the second view which sees the state 
as a towering power to reconcile intra- and inter-class conflicts in elections 
and democracy in Nigeria.   
  
Findings 
The lust for state power by the bourgeoisie or ruling class using the 
agents of state to rig elections, stuff ballot boxes, hire gangsters and 
marginalize the masses prepared the way for rise in electoral violence in the 
period of this study. Sometimes the ruling class achieved this situation by 
inaction or poor actions as when voting did not take place but results were 
announced or voting materials arrived too late for any fairness to be 
guaranteed. 
INEC particularly started failing by shoddy preparation of voters’ 
register claiming that the introduction of Electronic Voters Register came with 
teething problems. Again, TMG noted that ballot papers were printed without 
traceable numbers while INEC officials could not exert strict control regarding 
their distribution. The statutory display of Voters Register and possible 
supplementary Register were not strictly observed by INEC (See section 20 of 
the Electoral Act, 2006). Continuing the group observed that “security 
agencies that were deployed on election duties. . .connived with enemies of 
state not only to rob Nigerians of their mandate at gun point, but mercilessly 
killed and maimed the electorate in their hundreds”. One of the ugly 
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consequences of these lapses and irregularities was electoral violence resulting 
from the do-or-die attitude of the politicians. 
1.  Citizen observers’ results are hardly relied on in court cases. 
2. The citizen observers are almost always shabbily treated by the INEC, 
police and other security agencies, as against the royal diplomatic 
treatment accorded the foreign observers who sit in 5-star hotels in 
Abuja and state capitals to write, as results, whatever would protect 
their national interests. A prominent indictment of these international 
observers was the recent August 08, 2017 Kenyan presidential election 
which the foreign observers adjudged free, fair and credible, but which 
the Kenyan supreme court later annulled and ordered a fresh 
presidential vote within 60 days’’. This was happening in a country 
known for electoral fraud and violence. Indeed ‘‘ a disputed 2007 
presidential vote sparked violence that killed around 1,200 people and 
displaced around 600,000 more’’(https://www.independent.co.uk  of 
20 Sep 2017). 
 
A critical analysis of available data and literature revealed that there is 
a general agreement among scholars that elections in Nigeria are prone to 
violence before, during and after elections. Thus, the issue of electoral 
violence is as old as the nation. 
 
Conclusion 
This paper dwelt on challenges of citizen elections observation in 
Nigeria. Central to the entire argument is the fact that, in spite of plethora of 
instruments empowering local observation, the huge efforts made and risks 
taken by citizen or local observers, their findings rarely count at any level in 
the Nigerian electoral process. 
 
Suggestions 
For elections to be true reflections of the will of the people local 
observers must be given pride of place. Their findings must be made to count 
in the adjudication of election petitions. The citizen observers must be given 
level observation ground as the foreign observers. They should be accorded 
more respect and protection by the security agencies. On their part, the citizen 
observers must always be neutral and objective in their observations. That way 
Nigeria will be better placed to have freer, fairer and more credible elections, 
reflective of the will of the majority of the Nigerian electorate. 
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